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甘肃加快“碳足迹”管理体系建设,甘肃加快“碳足迹”管理体系建设_我的网站

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    Wind turbines operate at a wind farm in Burqin County, Altay Prefecture, Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, on July 25, 2026. Photo: VCG
In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology.
Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them.
The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon.
Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No.
The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale.
Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust.
Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive.
In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs.
The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression.
Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions.
This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage.
These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China.
In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated.
First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets.
Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency.
Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency.
"China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future. 
The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected] 
。    　　兰州8月25日电 (记者 冯志军)当归、黄芪、马铃薯种业、油橄榄等4项农特产品碳足迹量化方法已纳入地方标准立项计划，金川集团电积钴等15个镍钴系列产品、张掖市8个农产品完成碳足迹核算与认证……今年以来，甘肃加快推进碳足迹管理体系建设。　　甘肃省生态环境厅25日召开2026年第8次新闻发布会，披露上述信息。

B | 据介绍，近日，甘肃省委、省政府资源环境“六权”集成改革配套印发了《甘肃省进一步深化碳排放权改革实施方案》。　　甘肃作为生态资源大省，具有丰富的林草碳汇、新能源等优势，通过此次改革，促进生态资源转化为可交易、可增值的绿色资产，同步推进节能降碳、碳普惠、碳金融等工作，降碳、减污、扩绿、增长协同发力，助力全省经济社会发展全面绿色转型。2022年6月21日，主题为“全民参与垃圾分类 共享环保低碳生活”的垃圾分类宣传活动在兰州市举行。(资料图)徐雪 摄　　甘肃省生态环境厅应对气候变化处副处长杨帆介绍说，甘肃在制度层面创建碳排放置换制度，在监管层面建立碳排放报告简化核查管理制度和数据质量数智化监管系统，在模式层面构建“甘肃如意碳”碳普惠机制，在金融层面整合气候投融资与EOD(生态环境导向的开发模式)项目融资机制，形成多层次创新体系。　　杨帆表示，甘肃还聚焦“两高”(指高耗能、高排放)项目从准入环节严格管控新增碳排放，摸排并网光热发电、煤矿瓦斯利用、造林碳汇等13类适用该省的CCER(中国核证自愿减排量)项目，支持张掖市生态产品价值实现机制试点建设，充分体现甘肃特色。

C | 　　今年，甘肃制定了《美丽甘肃建设绿色金融项目入库指南》，可支持从能源、工业到生态修复、基础设施等全行业、全领域绿色低碳项目融资；同步搭建了“美丽甘肃建设绿色金融项目对接服务平台”，减轻企业和基层负担，压缩对接服务时限，积极促进绿色金融对美丽甘肃建设的支持。　　“下一步，将汇聚相关科研院所和高校专家力量，研究适用于甘肃省13项CCER方法学的简易估算方式，制定全省CCER项目调查摸排工作方案，建立跨部门、跨领域数据共享机制，力争2027至2028年分两批摸清全省CCER项目底数和减排潜力。”杨帆说。

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Published on:16:54:54